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By Democratic Audit
The John Lewis model reveals the tensions and paradoxes at
the heart of workplace democracy
Politicians of all parties have been keen to promote the ‘John Lewis model’ of industrial organisation,
emphasising its features of employee ownership and workplace democracy. Dr Abby Cathcart’s  research into
the company shows that management and workers have  different visions of what ‘partnership’  means, with
ongoing struggle taking place via the organisation’s democratic structures. This, she argues, has stark
implications for other organisations with partnership models that are less robust. 
The John Lewis
Partnership is
one of  Europe’s
largest models
of  employee
ownership and
has been
operating a
f orm of
employee
involvement and
participation
since its
f ormation in
1929. The
Partnership has
been described
in the media as
“a middle-class,
non-exploitative
institution, like
Radio 4 or the
National Trust”,
a “workers’
paradise” and
even the “blueprint of  a perf ect world, where everyone is decent and f air.” At the beginning of  2012, Deputy
Prime Minister Nick Clegg unveiled plans to create a ‘John Lewis economy’ and in July 2013 the Treasury
consulted on proposals f or £50m-worth of  tax breaks f or employee-owned businesses.
Despite f requent ref erences to the ‘John Lewis model’ in the media, there has been very litt le discussion of
the organisation’s structure or practices. Many of  the claims made about democratic f orms of  working
remain untested, and we need to be cautious about promoting the model without f irst gaining a deeper
insight into the experiences of  the 84,000 employees who work there.
The John Lewis Partnership has an unusual organisational structure including employee councils,
‘independent’ press and a prof it-share scheme. The Partnership was created in 1929 when John Spedan
Lewis signed an irrevocable settlement in trust which meant that the retail business which his f ather started
in 1864 would be given to the workers ‘present and prospective’. Lewis published a Constitution, expanded
the prof it-sharing scheme he had designed in 1919, and created a range of  democratic structures. The
Constitution f or the Partnership set out his vision of  a co-owned business, an experiment in industrial
democracy based on the principle of  ‘sharing knowledge, gain and power’.
John Lewis and Waitrose – owned by the Partnership – are widely admired and regularly top Which? polls,
as well as being awarded ‘Britain’s f avourite retailer’ f our years in a row. Commentators f requently claim
that it is the Partnership’s co-ownership structure which makes it so successf ul. Polit icians appear to be
equally impressed; both the Coalit ion government and Labour opposition have proposed that a John Lewis-
style Partnership model would have benef its in the public services. However, some scholars have accused
the f irm of  operating a f orm of  pseudo-democracy which does litt le to address the inequalit ies of  power
which f low f rom hierarchical organisation.
In my research I crit ically assessed the f unctioning of  workplace partnerships in John Lewis in the present
day, through an exploration of  the context, mechanisms and drivers f or partnership over the organisation’s
80-year history. I illuminated the structures and practices through which the Partnership claims to engage
employees and compete in a competit ive market. My f indings challenge the popular view of  the organisation
as a simple prof it sharing entity by emphasizing the radical intentions of  the f ounder, and exploring the
principles of  democratic participation outlined in the constitution. Workplace partnership in John Lewis is
rif e with tensions and paradoxes. The tension is not simply a struggle between management and workers,
but rather that managers and workers have f luctuating visions of  the purpose of  partnership and the best
way of  achieving that purpose. Managers welcomed ‘robust exchanges of  views’ and condemned
‘compliance’ and ‘def erence’. However, they also demanded ‘loyalty’ and support f or the management’s
decisions. Non-management partners wanted meaningf ul voice and a vote on key decisions, but they also
indicated their f aith in their management, and a pref erence f or seeking participation on operational rather
than strategic concerns.
Sharing profit , knowledge and power
The annual distribution of  prof its, known as the Partnership Bonus, has averaged 15% of  pay f or the last
twenty years. It is this prof it-sharing element of  the Partnership that is most well-known, and the annual
prof it share f eatures heavily in the press accompanied by photos of  celebrating workers and commentary
on how employee ownership leads to greater prof its. However, there are several f laws in the popular
understanding of  the organisation. Firstly it is a trust that owns the shares, not individual employees, and
unlike co-operative f orms of  organising, members do not contribute equally, or democratically control the
capital. Instead partners receive a share in prof its as long as they are employed by the organisation, and
that share is calculated as a percentage of  salary, so higher paid employees receive signif icantly more than
shop-f loor workers. Partners are unable to sell their shares, a point reinf orced by legal challenges made by
employees in what became known as the ‘carpet-bagging’ incident in the late 1990s. In recent years there is
evidence of  a move away f rom the f ounder’s views on pay and f airness. For instance the original
Constitution stated that no-one in the Partnership should be paid more than 25 times the pay of  a f ull- t ime
partner working in London; in 2012 a revised Constitution increased the ratio threef old f rom 25 to 75.
The second principle that the f ounder outlined was the idea that inf ormation should be shared f reely with
all partners. Knowledge is shared in a number of  ways. In-house magazines are distributed and partners
can write anonymously and the letter and reply (f rom senior management) must be published. My study
indicated that the ‘letters page’ was highly valued and partners relished their right to be crit ical and to
challenge anonymously through the journalism. Knowledge-sharing was also f acilitated through
representative bodies, including branch f orums, and a partnership-wide council.
The Partnership’s third principle, the sharing of  power, is enshrined in the Constitution. John Spedan Lewis
emphasised that conf lict between management and workers was natural and that democratic processes
would provide a f orum f or conf licts to be resolved. Partners were asked to vote on key decisions and elect
representatives to both the Partnership Council and the Board. The use of  the vote in the Partnership was
seen as a mechanism f or ensuring that management was accountable to the workf orce. Managers were
f ree to manage but were expected to do so according to the interests of  the co-owners, and subject to f ull
accountability to the managed. The Constitution enshrined this principle of  power-sharing through
organisational democracy; anyone seeking to alter the Constitution needed the approval of  two thirds of
the Partnership Council. The Council also had the power to remove the Chairman of  the Partnership by a
majority vote.
The Partnership has f aced a number of  challenges and changes to its democratic structures in recent
years. The Council has been the f orum f or debate on several matters of  strategic importance, including
seven day trading, the non-contributory pension scheme, store closures and constitutional change. On
many occasions during my research, I observed partners crit icise proposals, but then vote to accept them.
On other occasions, despite concerted campaigns f rom management to inf luence partners’ opinions, the
vote was used to reject management proposals. Signif icantly, a proposal to alter the Constitution and
remove voting rights in f avour of  a ‘consultation model’ was rejected, albeit by a f ine margin.
A key implication f or scholars and practit ioners f rom the 80-year-old experiment at John Lewis is that
mutual gains are only possible if  the partnership is structured in a way that acknowledges that employee
and employer interests are not necessarily always the same. Partnership in John Lewis is both an industrial
relations process and a model of  ownership and organisational structure. Democratic processes are
protected by the Constitution, which allows f or challenges to management. However, even with this
saf eguard in place, there is a constant struggle to redef ine partnership in a way that pref erences
managerial interests.  This f inding has stark implications f or less robust partnership models. The tensions
and paradoxes at the heart of  the debates about the meaning of  partnership remain, and mutual gain
continues to be elusive.
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